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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH,
]
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Case No. 20070187-CA

V.

GEORGE LARSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; criminal
trespass, a class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor. R. 39.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Was evidence that defendant violated a no-contact order, approached his
ex-girlfriend's apartment and broke do\\> n her locked door sufficient to support his
conviction for criminal mischief?

Issue 2: Was evidence that defendant violated a no-contact order, approached his
ex-girlfriend's apartment, and broke down her locked door sufficient to support his
conviction for criminal trespass?1
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ^[5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2) (West 2004)
A person commits criminal mischief if the person: . .. (c) intentionally
damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-206(2) (West 2004):
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if.. . (a) he enters or remains
unlawfully on property and:. .. (iii) is reckless as to whether his presence
will cause fear for the safety of another.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 27, 2006, defendant was charged with one count of being a
restricted person in possession of a dangerous weapon, one count of criminal mischief,
one count of trespass, and one count of disorderly conduct. R. 1-2. Following a bench
trial, defendant was convicted of one count of criminal mischief, one count of trespass,
and one count of disorderly conduct. R. 39-41. Defendant timely appealed. R. 55.
1

Though defendant was also convicted of disorderly conduct, he has not
challenged that conviction on appeal.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
After Tamela Hudyma moved out of defendant's home in February 20065 a judge
issued a no-contact order forbidding defendant from having any contact with Hudyma or
her daughter. R. 67: 6, 16-19. The landlord at Hudyma's apartment also stated that
defendant was not allowed on the property. R. 67: 27.
In spite of this, defendant approached Hudyma's apartment on November 15, 2006
and rang the doorbell. R. 67: 6. When Hudyma did not open the door, defendant broke
the door down and followed Hudyma as she retreated up the stairs. R. 67: 8, 30, 43.
When police arrived, they found defendant and Hudyma arguing in Hudyma's upstairs
bathroom. R. 67: 8, 49. As officers attempted to restrain defendant, he began yelling
profanities at them. R. 67: 42. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with
four misdemeanors. R. 1-3.
Defendant's theory at trial was that his actions were justified because he was
living with Hudyma at the time of the incident. Hudyma specifically rejected this claim:
Q: Mr. Larsen had some possessory interest in this place; is that correct, in your
home?
A: Had some what?
Q: He had some interest in your home; is that right?
A: Um, meaning like some - "[I]t is the province of the trier of fact[, in this case the trial court,] to determine
which testimony and facts to believe and what inferences to draw from those facts.'"
State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f 18, 15 P.3d 635 (citation omitted). On appeal
from a bench trial, this Court accordingly views the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's verdict. State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, \ 1 n.l, 76 P.3d 1173.

3

Q: Did he live there?
A: In my home?
Q: Yes.
A: No.
R. 67: 19.
Hudyma also specifically rejected defendant's assertion that he had any ownership
interest in her door:
Q: And that wasn't George's door; correct? It was your door.
A: It was my door.
R. 67: 15.
Hudyma and the responding officers also rejected defendant's claim that he had
not damaged the door when he broke into Hudyma's apartment. Hudyma explained that
defendant had previously kicked this same door in before, but that she had had the door
repaired prior to November 15, 2006. R. 67: 43-44. Hudyma said that she heard the
"wood crack" as defendant broke through, and officers who responded to the scene saw
"fresh wood laying . . . on the carpet of the apartment" by the door. R. 67: 25, 48, 51.
One of the officers also observed that "the dead bolt had been busted out." R. 67: 49.
Thus, while there may have been some residual damage to the door from the prior
incident, defendant did "further damage" to the door when he broke through on
November 15, 2006. R. 67: 8, 21, 29, 48-51.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of criminal
mischief. The evidence clearly showed that defendant inflicted damage to the door when
he broke through, however, and the evidence also specifically rebutted defendant's claim
that he had a possessory interest in Hudyma's apartment at the time of this incident.
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of criminal
trespass. The evidence clearly showed that defendant entered Hudyma's property
unlawfully, however, thereby supporting the trial court's verdict.
ARGUMENT
L

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of criminal

mischief. When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
"sustain[s] the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence," or "otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, % 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Furthermore, "it is the province of the trier of fact[, in this case the trial court,]
to determine which testimony and facts to believe and what inferences to draw from
those facts." State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344,115, 15 P.3d 635. This Court
therefore "determine[s] only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to
satisfy each element of the charge." State v. Horde, 2002 UT 4, \ 44, 57 P.3d 977.
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"A person commits criminal mischief if the person: . . . ( c ) intentionally damages,
defaces, or destroys the property of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2) (West
2004). In this case, Hudyma specifically testified that defendant damaged her door when
he broke it open, thereby satisfying the elements of the charge. R. 67: 8-9, 25.
In response, defendant first claims that the door was already damaged when he
knocked it down. Aplt. Br. 23. Though it is true that defendant had already damaged the
door in a prior incident, R. 67: 43, the evidence at trial showed that he damaged it again
on November 15, 2006. Specifically, Hudyma heard the "wood crack" as defendant
broke through the door, and officers who responded to the scene saw "fresh" damage to
the door, including "fresh wood laying . . . on the carpet of the apartment" by the door.
R. 67: 25, 48, 51. In addition, one of the officers observed that "the dead bolt had been
busted out" when defendant broke through. R. 67: 9, 49. When asked about the damage
during trial, Hudyma specifically stated that defendant did "further damage" to the door
when he broke through on November 15, 2006. R. 67: 8; see also R. 67: 21, 29, 48-51.
Given this unrebutted testimony, the trial court's conclusion that defendant damaged the
door was not against the clear weight of the evidence.
Defendant next claims that there was no evidence that he "destroyed] the property
of another," because he had a "possessory interest in the property as a cohabitant of
Hudyma." Aplt. Br. 25. This claim is incorrect. At trial, Hudyma specifically testified
that the door was hers, not defendant's. R. 67: 15. The trial court had the prerogative to
believe Hudyma's testimony on this point, Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, ^f 15, and
defendant's claim can be rejected on this basis alone.
6

Defendant's claim that he was Hudyma's cohabitant is similarly unavailing.
Assuming arguendo that defendant actually was Hudyma's cohabitant, defendant has not
provided any support for his claim that a cohabitant automatically gains an ownership
interest over the other cohabitant's real and personal property. This unsupported,
sweeping assertion is both inadequately briefed and frivolous on its face.
In any event, defendant was not Hudyma's cohabitant at the time of this incident.
In order to be a cohabitant, two persons must share a common residency. Haddow v.
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). Hudyma specifically stated, however, that she
did not live with defendant when he broke her door down. R. 67: 19. In fact, defendant
was subject to a no-contact order, thereby officially preventing him from residing with
Hudyma. R. 67: 6, 16-19. Defendant did not testify at trial, nor did he submit any
evidence of any kind of joint tenancy arrangement with respect to the apartment.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the fact that he had left some personal items at
Hudyma's apartment did not establish either residency or ownership over Hudyma's
door. Aplt. Br. 24. In Haddow, an ex-husband claimed that his ex-wife was sharing a
common residence with her new boyfriend. 707 P.2d at 673. Although the boyfriend had
left clothes, toiletries, and a photo album at the ex-wife's home, the supreme court held
that this was not enough to establish common residency: "[W]e fail to see any
determinative significance in the presence of any one or all of these portable items in the
appellant's residence." Id. Defendant in this case left his pet fish and some movies at
Hudyma's apartment, and he also sometimes left clothes there if Hudyma was doing
laundry. R. 67: 20. While this may have evidenced some sort of continuing personal
7

relationship, it simply did not establish common residency or shared ownership of
Hudyma's door. Thus, even if it did legally matter, defendant simply was not Hudyma's
cohabitant at the time of this incident.
Finally, defendant claims that he did not have the requisite intent to commit
criminal mischief because Hudyma was never actually afraid that she would be
physically harmed. Aplt. Br. 22-23, 25-26. Hudyma's fear (or lack thereof) was
irrelevant to the charge of criminal mischief. Though Utah Code Annotated § 76-6106(2)(b) does allow a charge of criminal mischief if the defendant "recklessly endangers
human life," the State did not charge defendant with violating § 76-6-106(2)(b). Rather,
the State charged defendant with violating § 76-6-106(2)(c) by "intentionally
damage[ing], defac[ing], or destroy[ing] the property of another." R. 2. Hudyma's state
of mind was therefore irrelevant to this charge.
In any event, the evidence did support the court's conclusion that defendant had
the intent to damage Hudyma's door under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-102(2)(c).
"Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's
conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom,
1999 UT App 289, ^ 10, 988 P.2d 949. "A person's state of mind is not always
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211,
1213 (Utah 1980); see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) ("It is well
established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence.").
Here, even there was a no-contact order in place ordering defendant to stay away
8

from Hudyma, defendant nevertheless approached Hudyma's apartment, broke her door
down, and followed Hudyma as she retreated up the stairs. R. 67: 8, 30, 43. Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not act against the clear weight of the evidence when it
concluded that defendant had the intent to damage Hudyma's door.
n.

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-206(2) (West 2004), "[a] person is guilty of

criminal trespass if... (a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:. .. (iii) is
reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another."
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not act against the clear weight of
the evidence when it concluded that defendant entered Hudyma's apartment unlawfully.
As discussed above, the evidence showed that defendant: (1) violated a no-contact order
by entering Hudyma's apartment, R. 67: 6, 16-18; (2) violated an express order of no
entry by the building's landlord, R. 67: 27; and (3) unlawfully damaged Hudyma's door
as he entered in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106.
In response, defendant again claims that he had an unqualified right to enter the
apartment because he had some sort of possessory interest in it. As discussed above,
however, while the evidence did show that defendant had left a few personal items at the
apartment, the evidence also showed that defendant was not residing there, and there was
no evidence of any official leasehold or shared residency agreement. Thus, defendant did
not have a right of entry, let alone a possessory interest in the apartment, and he therefore
acted unlawfully by breaking Hudyma's door down in an effort to gain access.

9

With respect to the intent element, the State alleged below that defendant had
"reckless[ly] .. . caused fear for the safety of another." R. 2. On appeal, while defendant
discusses Hudyma's fear (or lack thereof) with respect to the criminal mischief charge, he
does not expressly renew the argument with respect to criminal trespass. Aplt. Br. 27-29.
Even if defendant has somehow renewed the argument by implication, it should
still be rejected. The State was not required to prove that Hudyma was actually afraid in
order to sustain the charge of criminal trespass. Rather, the State simply needed to show
that by entering unlawfully, defendant was "reckless as to whether his presence will
cause fear for the safety of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii). A person
acts recklessly when he or she "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004). In this case, after Hudyma did not
answer the door when defendant rang her doorbell, defendant physically broke her door
open, "crack[ing]" the door and "bust[ing] out" the dead bolt in the process. R. 67: 49.
Given the no-contact order that was already in place, these violent and aggressive actions
created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Hudyma would fear for her safety when
defendant finally broke through. Thus, the trial court did not act against the clear weight
of the evidence when it concluded that defendant had the requisite intent to commit
criminal trespass.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the convictions below.
Respectfully submitted October •ZT, 2007.
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